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Introduction: The Politics and Philosophy of Critical-HCI 
The intention of this article is to develop a critical theory of human computer interaction 
(critical-HCI) that tests some of the assumptions and omissions made in the field as it 
transitions from a cognitive theoretical frame to a phenomenological understanding of user 
experience described by Harrison et al (2007) as a third research paradigm and similarly 
Bødker (2006, 2015) as third wave HCI. As a significant constituent of twenty-first-century 
trends in HCI, the focus on experience has provided some novel avenues of enquiry focused 
on embodied interactions (Dourish 1999; 2004), felt experiences (Wright and McCarthy 
2004), emotions and affect (Norman 2004; Picard 1997) grasped in ever more pervasive and 
smart technological contexts of use (e.g. Kuniavsky 2010). Nonetheless, this article contends 
that interest in experience does more than simply address new use contexts in academic 
circles. It also draws attention to a distinct bridge between conventional HCI disciplinary 
concerns with predominantly task based digital work and a growing business interest in 
consumer experiences in digital environments. Indeed, as the notion of the user experience 
(UX) becomes embedded in the HCI curriculum, commercial practices and the operational 
level of digital media, it simultaneously develops into a powerful marketing tool that business 
enterprises readily utilize in order to tap into experiential triggers that establish, some argue, 
cognitive, emotional and visceral engagements between consumers and the digital 
commodities, services and brands they consume (Norman 2004).  
It is my further contention that the problem of experience needs to be addressed by critical-
HCI in two interrelated ways. On one hand, a critical approach needs to explore the role 
market logic plays in putting user experiences to work - what I go on to call in this article 
experience capitalism: a term closely related to notions of an experience economy. This is an 
economic model that ushers in new experiential contexts for user/consumer interactions 
with the marketplace increasingly accessed through pervasive digital media technologies with 
enhanced operational capacities. Here we find a significant and potentially reciprocal overlap 
between established media theory critiques of the political economy in which digital 
communication technologies are operative and the need for critical-HCI. On the other, 
critical-HCI needs to fully engage with ontological understandings of experience hitherto 
realized in HCI by way of a phenomenological matrix (Harrison et al 2007). The idea is to test 
the limits of this matrix by drawing on an alternative philosophy of experience, which, I 
argue, helps critical-HCI to more effectively approach ontological transitions to new 
technological contexts of interaction. This means bringing in an old thinker (A.N. Whitehead) 
to consider experience in novel ways that relate ontological concerns to this broader political 
concept (and persistence) of experience capitalism. 
What is at stake in this political-philosophical enquiry is the status of human consciousness as 
understood by, on one hand, current phenomenological HCI, and on the other, the 
nonbifurcated theory of experience Whitehead (2004) conceived of in the 1920s. The twofold 
problem that consequently emerges from this dual venture concerns the extent to which 
experience of twenty-first-century digital media systems can be regarded as under the spell 
of subjective minds, or alternatively, conceived of as a production of subjective experience 
composed in the durational events of interaction. The article concludes by asking if it is the 
case that, as one post-phenomenologist media theorist assumes, the ontological status of a 
once privileged human experience of media is somehow cut out of the loop between user 
interaction and operational media (Hansen 2015), or, following Whitehead’s nonbifurcated 
adventure, can we conceive of a politics of experience in which the mindful experience of 
(and human interaction with) the external world is regarded as inseparable from the 
durational passage of events.    
The Three Paradigms of HCI Revisited 
This article marks a development on an earlier critical-HCI focus on efficiency analysis that 
runs seamlessly through the three paradigms of HCI (Sampson 2016, 45-74). To briefly recap 
on this work it is important to note that each paradigm is defined by Harrison et al (2007) 
according to three distinct metaphors of interaction. The first concerns the body/machine 
couplings developed in a predominantly engineering/pragmatic focus on ergonomic design 
(let us call this the ergonomic paradigm). The second (the cognitive paradigm) is arrived at 
through the influence of cognitive psychology and a theoretical framework developed around 
the mind/computer metaphor. The third paradigm (my main focus here) is informed by a 
number of trends in HCI research including phenomenological arrived at notions of embodied 
interaction, a neuroscientific leaning toward the role of emotions, feelings and affect in 
cognitive computer work and recognition of new technological use contexts brought about 
by innovations in pervasive computing, for example. For reasons that will become apparent, I 
have replaced the notion of a phenomenological matrix with a catchall name for this recent 
shift in focus: the experience paradigm. However, following my earlier approach to efficiency 
analysis in each paradigm, I will similarly argue here that experience is not simply the defining 
factor of a third paradigm of computer interaction, but can be traced through all three 
paradigms as they each endeavour to capture the variations of experience in different ways. 
So unlike Bødker (2006), for example, who argues for a discontinuity between a second 
paradigm related to computer work efficiency and a third all about online consumer 
experience, I note a continuity apparent in the efficiency analysis of work and consumption in 
which experiences are similarly put to work. Indeed, in addition to the contextual political 
and philosophical discussion below, the article will also set out a nascent agenda for a critical-
HCI events based analysis of each paradigm focused on an alternative concept of experience 
informed by Whitehead.  
Part One: A Political Economy of Experience 
This first section brings in a political perspective intended to address a general omission in 
HCI research concerning the user experience; that is to say, it draws attention to the role 
capitalism plays in shaping a new alienating economic space of commodity production 
developing around shared experiences and the increasing ubiquity of an operational level of 
digital technology intended to capture, cultivate and put experiences to work. To begin with, 
the politics of user experience needs to be couched in discussions concerned with what has 
been termed the experience economy (Pine and Gilmore 2010). This is an economic model 
intimately related to developmental trends in HCI research and its wider relation to a 
burgeoning UX industry. To be sure, it is the very foundation on which the aforementioned 
bridge between HCI and business has been constructed. It would seem that whereas earlier 
HCI research paradigms were dependent on the metaphorical coupling of human bodies and 
minds to machines in the digital workplace, a fresh focus on experience shifts ever more 
toward understanding the processing of emotional, affective and felt experiences with new 
digital communication contexts involved in work and consumption. As follows, the 
experience economy is composed of a digital circuitry linking together workers, consumers 
and business in ways that are assumed to owe more to the aesthetic of a Walt Disney theme 
park or theoretical production than Henry Ford’s factory model (Pine and Gilmore 2010, 56).  
The origins of the experience economy have been traced back to Alvin Toffler’s 1970 book, 
Future Shock, and a chapter therein titled “The Experience Makers” which prophesizes where 
the economy is heading after the exhaustion of the service industries (Pine and Gilmore, 
2013). It is here that Toffler (1970, 208-09) first introduces the idea of the experience 
industries.  
[The experience industries are] a revolutionary expansion of certain industries 
whose sole output consists not of manufactured goods, nor even ordinary 
services, but pre-programmed ‘experiences’. The experience industry could turn 
out to be one of the pillars of super-industrialism, the very foundation, in fact, of 
the post-service economy… the experience industry of the future and the great 
psychological corporations, or psych-corps... will dominate.  
A similar theme emerges in the field of consumer research in the early 1980s where Holbrook 
and Hirschman (1982, 132-40)  argue for “an experiential view” of consumption focused on 
the symbolic, hedonic (the pursuit of fantasies, feelings, and fun), and aesthetics of the 
consumption experience. It is in 1999, nonetheless, when Pine and Gilmore (2010), seemingly 
unaware of Toffler’s futurology, introduce a notion of the experience economy that can now 
be concretely related to the current digital landscape. As follows, the twenty-first-century 
expansion of the UX industry (a convergence of interaction design and marketing akin to 
Toffler’s psych-corps) can indeed be grasped as a major component of a political economy of 
experience marked by a shift from commodities, factory goods, and services to the added 
value of experiential consumption increasingly associated with industrial scale operations in a 
digitalized environment.  
Following the experience economy model, the added value of digital experiences can, on one 
hand, include conventional commodities, goods and services readily transformed into new 
experiences realized through design, branding and marketing. The point is that the 
experience economy is more attuned to the idea that it is the experience itself that often 
captivates user-consumer attention, leading to emotional engagements and the all-important 
purchase intent (Norman 2004). At its most deep-seated though, on the other hand, there is 
a commodification of experiences that do not refer back to a tangible product or service. The 
design of smart phone interactions with social media are apposite here. The value extracted 
from user interactions with social media apps, for example, does not appear to relate in any 
palpable way to a conventional product, but instead extracts value from the experience of 
social interaction. It is this digital transformation of commodity production that arguably 
leads to a business need to realize value in newly mediated interactions and experiences 
related to social context. It is indeed the work of the UX industry, composed of UX 
consultants, interaction designers, information architects, ethnographers, behavioural 
psychologists, big data researchers, coders, biofeedback experts, network strategists and 
online marketers to produce the sensory environments in which shared experiences can be 
captured, cultivated and exploited. 
The UX industry is able to draw on the resourceful expertise of a range of specialists to prime 
sensory environments in which experiences might occur, but no one person or business 
enterprise produces experience. To be sure, the broader concept of experience capitalism 
emerges from research into (and extracting value from) what is already in action. Borrowing 
from Langlois and Elmer’s (2013) approach to corporate social media, we might say that what 
experience capitalism does is more closely aligned to the patterning of experience, and I 
might add, significantly focused on the relational aspects of interaction and the capacity of 
machines to learn from social context rather than individual subjective experience. Here we 
can see how Pine and Gilmore’s (2010) Erving Goffman inspired theatre productions are 
perhaps expanded to a point where the capture of the performance of experience moves 
beyond any one locatable subjective viewpoint to the massive-scale automations of 
experience gathering. As these big data captures become more pervasively realized through 
the invention of ubiquitous computer technologies, the subjective experience – described by 
Goffman as the presentation of self, is, as Greenfield (2006) argues, increasingly teased out 
into the public domain. That is to say, human subjectivity is not the producer of experience 
(indeed, as I will contend below, it never has been). On the contrary, experience capitalism 
persists in a world full of social media apps, relational databases, sensors and computerized 
things that process experiences in which subjectivities are constantly being made.  
We can see the extent to which this economic shift toward experience steadily dovetails with 
the three paradigms of HCI.  Ostensibly, the pragmatic concerns of early designers of 
computing systems demonstrated very little regard for the user experience beyond a 
Tayloristic concern with bodily fatigue associated with inefficiencies in the workplace. 
However, the eventual introduction of social factors into ergonomics followed by a 
conceptual move to a second paradigm underpinned by cognitive psychology and centrality 
of the information metaphors of mind/computer coupling, transitions increasingly toward a 
focus on user need, for example, through usability studies. The subsequent development of 
user related services, like user testing, heralds a distinctive trend toward incorporating 
elements of use initially focused on cognitive processes of memory, attention and 
perception, but latterly incorporating user motivation, frustration and satisfaction, requiring 
some knowledge of emotions, feelings and affect. This trend can perhaps be seen as a 
precursor to third paradigm concerns with the processing of felt experience, including 
previously marginalized research questions, such as, what is fun (Harrison et al 2007).  
To fully understand the bridge that spans HCI and the experience economy, there is a need to 
look more closely at two components of third paradigm research. Firstly, there are fresh 
concerns with the role emotions, affect and feelings play in the processing of experience. 
Secondly, the research focus shifts towards exploring new pervasive contexts of computing 
use. It is my contention here that while much attention has been given to the undoubted 
importance of these two components of third paradigm HCI (e.g. Boehner et al 2007), there 
is a further need to explore how each becomes interwoven with the experience economy. 
Processing Experience through Emotions, Feelings and Affect 
The third paradigm marks the significant appearance of emotion in HCI research as it 
emerges from its marginal positioning in the cognitive paradigm. Most notably this interest in 
emotion stems from the HCI related affective computing research carried out by Rosalind 
Picard (1997) at MIT, as well as the work of HCI and UX guru, Don Norman (2004), whose 
influential emotional design thesis borrows from neuroscientific ideas concerning the so-
called emotional brain thesis to inform a model of experience processing. According to 
Norman (2004: 21-24) experience is processed through three interconnected levels: 
reflective (cognitive), behavioural (use) and visceral (affective). This approach does not 
however go unchallenged in HCI. To be sure, Harrison et al (2007) draw attention to  a “wide 
range of [opposing] approaches to emotion” including challenges to the “central role” it is 
assumed to play in cognition as a kind of “information flow.” In contrast, there is a rejection 
of the “equation of emotion with information” in favour of an “interpretation and co-
construction of emotion in action [and interaction]” (Harrison 2007). The transition from 
second to third paradigm HCI research plays a key role in how these opposing conceptions of 
emotional experience take shape. To begin with, the accusation against Norman’s model of 
experience processing is that it (a), remains stuck with one foot firmly in the cognitive 
paradigm and its tendency to reduce experience to the internal processor (and rationality) of 
the individual user’s mind (i.e. the cognitive mind/computer metaphor), and (b) tends to 
counterpoise cognition and emotion. A second kind of emotional experience therefore 
emerges which is referenced back to Wittgenstein, and argues that emotions are not the 
opposite of cognition, but like cognition, they are made in social and cultural interactions. 
Indeed, Boehner et al (2007) argue for a culturally grounded understanding of emotional 
experience in HCI research that recognizes the dynamics of shared experience socially 
constructed in action and interaction.  
Experiencing the Internet of Things 
Following fairly recent discourses from the technology sector, we can see how the digitized 
experience economy has the potential to considerably expand beyond the current wave of 
social computing to the Internet of Things (IoT). We may indeed already have one foot firmly 
standing in a future wherein experiential data, mostly captured today by way of conventional 
computing devices like PCs, mobile tablets and smart phones, are being gathered from 
interactions with pervasive computing in every conceivable location, everywhere and at any 
time. To be sure, experiences are already being captured through interactions with everyday 
things like cars and so-called wearables (fitness gadgets and training shoes, watches etc.), 
and now other things, like kettles, mirrors, speakers, furniture, pavements, and streetlamps 
are fast becoming computational devices. There are a number of implications for the growth 
of the experience economy (and the focus of HCI research) in terms of the changing 
spatiotemporal experience of computing. To begin with, the disappearance of the 
conventional graphical user interface (GUI) and dissolving of computer power into these 
everyday objects will alter the way the subject/object relation with technology is approached. 
Encounters with IoT will be triggered by non-task interactions, fleeting moments of contact, 
often hidden from users, and even accidentally engendered interaction. Furthermore, 
biometric detection systems could potentially capture data about the affective valence of the 
body. Here the capacity of facial recognition software, for example, to detect emotional 
responses to environmental stimuli comes into play. Secondly, pervasive computing 
challenges the way cognitive process, like memory, perception and attention, have been 
conventionally studied in HCI. For instance, although generally considered as an 
augmentation of memory, media technology can capture past experiences, lost to memory in 
the complex passage and variation of events, so that they can be prompted back into action 
in the present. In other words, via machine learning technologies, forgotten experiences can 
work in the background to generate inferred experiential performances (Blackwell, 2015) 
that become perceptible in the here and now of the experience economy. Thirdly, although 
the capture of entangled experiences relating to animals, landscape and climate is already 
yielding a kind of nonhuman experiential data, the pervasive operational level of 
computingmay well threaten the status of an assumed human centred, conscious experience 
(Hansen 2015).  
The Phenomenological Matrix  
Harrison et al (2007) contend that the changing digital environment draws our attention to 
the importance of embodiment in third paradigm HCI research. How we come to 
“understand the world, ourselves, and interaction” in these new contexts crucially derives, 
they argue, “from our location in a physical and social world as embodied actors” (Harrison et 
al 2007). Embodied interaction has become one of the major concerns of HCI, as such, and to 
understand it researchers have turned to phenomenology. Dourish (1999; 2004), for 
example, sees these new contexts as intimately linked to the technological changes he first 
observed in the latter part of the twentieth century. To begin with, in the 1970s, GUI 
technology introduced a visualization of computing that prompted a representational turn in 
the study of interaction typified by cognitive task based testing and mental models utilized in 
the cognitive paradigm. Yet by the 80s the growth in digital network communication adds 
new importance to the social in interaction design, prompting a trend in research toward 
analysing distributed notions of cognition. Subsequently, in the 90s, when computing first 
begins to break out of the screen and make its way into the physical environment in the 
shape of tangible technologies, attention is drawn toward the limits of the cognitive 
approach. It is indeed these two latter developments in the context of computer use (social 
and tangible) that, Dourish (2004, 15-22) argues, require a new HCI framework focused on 
embodiment and grasped through the twentieth century phenomenological tradition. 
Embodiment is defined in a way that makes it useful to the HCI researcher because it 
provides a “property of being manifest in and of the every-day world” in which interactions 
take place (Dourish 1999). This property is not, however, simply restricted to physical things, 
like computers or mobile devices, but can include participatory patterns, like conversations 
between “two equally embodied people” set against “a backdrop of an equally embodied set 
of relationships, actions, assessments and understandings” (Dourish 1999). This backdrop 
owes an initial debt to Husserl’s phenomenology, insofar as it is seen as part of a transition 
away from an experience of the world grasped through the realm of abstract ideas (idealism) 
to one derived from the experience of concrete phenomena.  However, importantly, more 
attention is given to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in third paradigm HCI research. In the first 
instance, Heidegger famously tried to escape Husserl’s “mentalistic model that placed the 
focus of experience in the head” (Dourish, 1999). This is, evidently, important to the third 
paradigm’s similar transition from the cognitive realm of mental modelling to embodied 
interaction whereby interaction is no longer considered in the head (or mind), “but out in the 
world… that is already organised in terms of meaning and purpose” (Dourish 2004, 108). 
Indeed, Heidegger’s ontological worldview is not taken as a given - it arises through 
interaction (Dourish 1999). 
 
Dourish is not the first to utilize Heidegger for HCI purposes. Below he uses Winograd and 
Flores (1986) adoption of the phenomenological distinction between “ready-to-hand” and 
“present-at-hand” to explain a distinctly first paradigm experience.  
 
[C]onsider the mouse connected to my computer. Much of the time, I act through 
the mouse; the mouse is an extension of my hand as I select objects, operate 
menus and so forth. The mouse is, in Heidegger’s terms, ready-to-hand. 
Sometimes, however, for instance on those occasions when I reach the edge of the 
mousepad and cannot move the mouse further, my orientation towards the mouse 
changes; now, I become conscious of the mouse mediating my action, and the 
mouse becomes the object of my attention as I pick it up and move it back to the 
centre of the mouse-pad. When I act on the mouse in this way, being mindful of it 
as an object of my activity, the mouse is present-at-hand (Dourish 2011, 109).  
 
This switching between automatic interaction and mindful attention suggests that the mouse 
only really exists because of the way it becomes present-at-hand through embodied 
interaction. The point is that the mindful activity of using the mouse is constitutive of 
ontology, not independent of it (Dourish, 1999). The mouse comes into being in the mind 
because, it would seem, it is part of an embodied experience of being in the world. Indeed, 
this notion of mindful embodiment is developed further, Dourish (2004, 114) notes, by 
Dreyfus (1996) who brings in the phenomenology of perception developed by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1962).  Here we find that perception itself is an active process, carried out by 
an embodied subject. As a result, third paradigm HCI research begins to focus on a somewhat 
dualistic distinction between the “physical embodiment of a human subject, with legs and 
arms, and of a certain size and shape” and a “cultural world” from which subjects extract 
meaning from (Dourish 2004, 114). From this stance the importance of developing “bodily 
skills and situational responses,” alongside mindful acts (or “cultural skills”), which in turn 
respond to the user’s embeddedness in this “cultural world,” comes to the fore (Dourish 
1999).  It is in between bodily and mindful interactions that abilities and understandings of 
computing are developed. There is also a considerable social component to this notion of 
interaction. On one hand then, we find the presence of the phenomenological body of the 
user-subject, who, on the other hand, simultaneously becomes the “objective body” 
experienced and understood by others in the cultural worlds they encounter (Dourish 2004, 
115). From this point on, HCI researchers start to draw on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenal 
perception of embodied and cultural worlds to develop, for example, “a taxonomy of 
embodied actions for the analysis of group activity” (Dourish 2004, 115; Robertson 1997). 
 
Although escaping Husserl’s mental prison of the head to explain how experience emerges 
from human interaction with the world, human perception remains stubbornly (and 
problematically) central to the phenomenologist’s ontology. Whether or not it is in the head 
or embodied in the world, HCI phenomenology similarly begins with the notion that it is the 
human who has the experience. In other words, where the action is can be grasped 
ontologically as it is sensed (in the head, in the hand or through some other bodily 
interaction) to the human. So why use Whitehead to challenge such a position and what tools 
can we take from this radical departure from the phenomenological tradition?  
Part Two: A Whiteheadian Adventure in HCI 
A Whiteheadian adventure in HCI offers a challenging but also profound alternative concept 
of experience that illuminates these emerging use contexts in new ways distinct from a 
phenomenological approach that has thus far situated minds and bodies in a bifurcated 
relation to environmental experience (Whitehead 2004). This is Whitehead’s (2004) 
ostensibly uncanny notion that experience did not start with subjective human 
consciousness. That is to say, the world, and the cosmos it floats in, did not simply begin with 
the arrival of human awareness. Indeed, it is not human consciousness that draws attention 
to experience. It is, on the contrary, experience that draws attention to an anomalous 
worldview limited by its own perception of the here and now. For Whitehead, it is important 
to avoid a solipsistic theory of mindful perception which erroneously bifurcates from the 
concreteness of the passage of nature from which it emerged. Whitehead’s adventure 
therefore offers a constraining philosophical point of departure since it is not phenomenal 
human consciousness that sheds light on experience, but experience in the actual world that 
draws attention to the aberration that is human consciousness. In other words, it is very 
important that the place and time (the here and now) of interaction is no longer simply 
understood as an anthropomorphic phenomenal experience, but rather grasped through a 
set of tools that refuse the bifurcation between mind and the nature of what is experienced. 
As follows, in Whitehead’s early process philosophy, the embodied location of points in time 
and positions in space suggested in the phenomenological matrix are not regarded as well 
formulated problems since they overlook the complex “temporal thickness” and intensity of 
the durational quality of the actual occasions (or events) of experience (Whitehead 2004, 
56). 
Of course, HCI researchers may well want to question the value of an approach to HCI that 
side-lines the human, or more specifically, human consciousness. However, this stance is 
important to critical-HCI because the transient perception of the subject-user of the here and 
now of experience only represents a small slice of the passage of events occurring in the 
actual world. Arguably therefore the focus on human perception neglects to grasp the full 
extent of the shift to the experience economy and changes to the technological 
infrastructure that newly redefine where the action is. This is not, however, an approach that 
is dead set against perception. But perception needs to be seen as only taking into account 
what occurs (Stengers 2014, 147). This is not the same as saying that perception produces 
reality. Perception does not decide if things are more or less real! That is to say, embodied 
interaction only goes as far as declaring mere instants of percipient, and sometimes specious, 
events in experience. What the adventure profoundly tells us is that it is, inversely, the 
process of reality that produces subjectivity.  
Analytical Tools for Non-Bifurcated Experience 
In a nutshell, Whitehead helps us rethink the status of human consciousness in HCI. While 
the phenomenologist brings in a bifurcation between the perceiving human mind, 
embodiment and experience in the actual world, a Whiteheadian adventure eschews 
theories that force such a bifurcation. The phenomenologist, for example, takes what is 
experienced in the actual world as the here and now. What is ready-in-hand, for instance, 
becomes a position in space and a point in time from which meanings can be constructed 
from what is present-in-hand. But this perception of the here and now of experience is, 
following Whitehead, an often misplaced abstraction of a far more complex relation to reality 
experienced through a concrete passage of events.  For Whitehead then the data of 
experience are not in the mind. The actual world is not apprehended by the mind; on the 
contrary the mind is part of the passage of events in the actual world. Significantly though, it 
is not that mindfulness does not exist; evidently, it does, but the mind only has a “foothold” 
in experience rather than a “command post” (Stengers 2014, 67). 
Whitehead was determined not to limit his philosophical outlook to theories that made such 
a bifurcation happen. He looked, as such, to develop new concepts of experience that are not 
exclusively the property of human perception, but rather inclusive and interlocked with the 
actual world humans are a part of. Of course, this is a complex task. It is necessary to, first, 
undo the subject predicated philosophies developed over epochs of human consciousness; to 
completely disengage from the solipsistic sense that humans are the masters of subjectivity 
when it comes to observing real material substances or the formulation of ideas that describe 
them. It also means overcoming the language games we have absorbed into our minds that 
explain our subjective experience of the real world in such limited ways. Second, and clearly 
related to HCI, we need to challenge the rigidity of subject-object relations as the only way to 
think about the ontology of spatial interaction, and, third, Whitehead prompts us to move 
beyond purely spatial concepts of interaction to radically approach experience in terms of the 
passage of events.  
Freeing Subjects and Objects from the Syntax Trap 
The Whiteheadian adventure asks us to test the limits of language and redesign it in a similar 
way to which the tools of physics are intended to better probe the dynamics of the actual 
world. As Whitehead contends, language was designed to handle a static world and fails, as 
such, to express the dynamics of reality (Urban 1951, 304). For example, in his endeavour to 
refuse bifurcation Whitehead criticized the orthodox concept of “having an experience” of an 
object since it is erroneously determined by the mould of the subject-predicate. That is to 
say, the subject (the knower) is always situated by the experience of the object (the known). 
As Victor Lowe (1951, 106) argues, the subject-predicate mould is “stamped on the face of 
experience” so that the experient is the subject who is always qualified by the sensations of 
the objective world. This is how language traps experience in the unidirectional relation 
between the private subject and the public object.  
Whitehead’s intervention into the trappings of language are of use to critical-HCI for two 
main reasons. Firstly, we see how the subject predicate trap is already at work in the research 
focus on situated interactions where, for example, it might be said that the user experiences 
the smooth ergonomics of the mouse so that the subject-user is situated by their experience 
of the public object. As a counterintuitive alternative, Whiteheadian subjects can be made 
into objects, and inversely, objects into subjects. The notion that objects can experience 
subjects, as is the case when a well-designed mouse experiences the hand of the user, should 
not perhaps be an entirely alien design concept in tangible computing or ergonomics. But, by 
drawing on Whitehead’s reinvention of terms like feeling, emotion, satisfaction and 
enjoyment theorists are able to develop effective ways to account for the relationalities of 
experience not yet adequately realized, so that it might be possible to conjure up a concept 
of the mouse feeling the warmth of the user’s hand. The subject does not simply know the 
object, but is provoked into knowing by the experience of the object. Furthermore, in the 
new IoT contexts of interaction a user who encounters an object can become the subject of 
interaction. It might be the case then, as Hayles (2009) similarly argues, that in twenty-first-
century media subject agency has ceded control to the technological object; that is to say, 
the binary divide between active, communicative subjects and passive, silent, ﬁxed objects, 
no longer works. HCI researchers may also have to take into account objects that have 
become sociable (Mitew 2014), sidestepping human awareness or taking the place of 
humans altogether. Ultimately though, rethinking experience as neither predicated by 
subject nor object makes way for immanent relations in which subjective forces are not 
predetermined as the knowers of objects, but focus attention instead on the shifting 
relations in which each experiences the other.  
Secondly, in Whitehead, we encounter a viable alternative to Heidegger’s solution to 
Husserl’s problematic concept of experience as locked inside the head wherein experience is 
said to be “the self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of being one arising out of the 
composition of the many.” (Whitehead 1985, 145). This is not a self-satisfying moment in 
time beginning in the head, brain, mind or body. Experience may indeed be related to human 
activities of the brain, mind or body, but they cannot be decoupled from the interlocking 
relations of the actual world. As Whitehead (cited in Dewey 1951, 644. Emphasis added by 
Dewey) puts it:  
[W]e cannot determine with what molecules the brain begins and the rest of the 
body ends. Further, we cannot tell with what molecules the body ends and the 
external world begins. The truth is that the brain is continuous with the body, and 
the body is continuous with the rest of the natural world. Human experience is an 
act of self-origination including the whole of nature, limited to the perspective of a 
focal region, located within the body, but not necessarily persisting in any fixed 
coordination with a definite part of the brain.  
Clearly, this is not experience limited to any privileged sense organ (the brain or the 
sensation of a body), or indeed, a higher level of consciousness (the all-perceiving mind with 
the capacity for language). Although, Whitehead (1967, 78) concedes that human 
consciousness may well be an exhibit of the “most intense form of the plasticity of nature,” 
there is no dichotomy between the human and what is experienced, and ultimately, in this 
nonbifurcated sense-making assemblage, nature is closed to mind.  
Space is Interaction 
As we will see below Whitehead fundamentally changes the concept of space by introducing 
a process philosophy in which it is the passage of events that is experienced. To be sure, early 
on in his so-called pre-speculative epistemological phase Whitehead sought to develop a 
relational theory intended to overturn the ancient Greek’s notion of absolute space (Lowe 
1951, 53-54). This nascent trajectory of the adventure begins with a mathematician’s interest 
in overturning orthodox geometry. The problem for Whitehead is the geometric point! His 
relational theory of space thus notes how time is missing or constrained to points in the 
Euclidean geometric grid. He argues that things do not occur in points in space; points are 
not ultimate entities, but abstractions of complex durations. We need to therefore forget a 
concept of space defined as the place where we find bodies at certain fixed points in time, 
acting on each other. Indeed, interaction is not a property of space. Bodies are not in space 
because they interact. Space is, in itself, a certain kind of process of interaction. Interaction in 
space is not, as such, defined by one point effecting another, for example, the hand meeting 
the mouse, but is a coming together of a coherent population of interacting bodies into a 
society of events. It is this process of coming together, what Whitehead would go on to call 
concrescence, which requires attention and needs explaining as best we can (Lowe 1951, 
104).  
In critical-HCI we might start by redefining interaction as an imminent relation in which it is 
not points in time or space that are experienced, but durations. This again fundamentally 
changes the terms of third paradigm HCI research. Where the action is does not bring us to a 
location determined by the perceiving mind or indeed where a body interacts with a 
computer, but space itself is interaction. Here we can see how the first paradigm may well 
have been onto something that the second and third have gone on to ignore. Instead of 
concentrating on perceptive locations of interaction in space – i.e. the points in space where 
hands (and minds) meet the mouse – ergonomic experts engaged in capturing (and breaking 
down) computer tasks into discrete activities in time. Albeit an oversimplification of a passage 
of time lacking in the thickness required by Whitehead’s theory of events (Stengers 2014, 52), 
the first paradigm ergonomic study of interaction is not limited to a notion of perception 
fixed to a geometric grid.  
Like third paradigm HCI, the Whiteheadian adventure endeavours to escape from the same 
Cartesian structures that underpin the second cognitive paradigm. To do this Whitehead 
borrows from William James’s concept of pure experience to make a contra-Cartesian move 
(Stengers 2014, 70). But we must first clearly distinguish here between the 
phenomenological contra-Cartesian position Dourish (2004, 127; 191) takes in Where the 
Action Is and Whitehead’s event analysis. On one hand, Dourish (2004, vii) is critical of the 
cognitive paradigm’s convention of grasping interaction through a mind-computer metaphor 
that seems to have lost its relation to a body. As we have seen, embodied interaction is not 
just information in the mind; it is also experienced in the hand. On the other hand though, 
Whitehead does not regard mind or body as the situation where interaction occurs, but 
rather draws attention to how both are composed in a passage of events. The “I” of the mind 
(and the body from which it seems to belong) does not determine who we are, since in the 
duration of events, both body and mind are swept up in the present before slipping into the 
past. So unlike Descartes dualism, the mind does not determine who we are. Again, this is not 
the command post of experience we find in the phenomenological matrix. To be sure, the 
mind always comes later! The experience does not therefore belong to the mind. The mind’s 
perceptual judgements, as well as its apparent capacity for memory and attention, can only 
testify to the passage of events from its percipient foothold - in the duration of events 
(Stengers 2014, 75).  
From an events perspective then we can begin to look at perception in a very different light 
from the phenomenological subject and her interaction with concrete objects in abstract 
points of time and space. Perception needs to be approached not by way of what is ready or 
present-in-hand, but by way of what is in passage; in what Whitehead calls a percipient event 
(Whitehead 2004, 107-08). So unlike the phenomenal mind that puts concrete objects to 
death because they are only ready-to-hand or miraculously brings them back to life since 
they are here right now and present-at-hand, in mental space, it is the event itself that 
becomes the concrete fact of experience. There would be no objects to perceive, no 
mindfulness of objects, without the passing of these concrete events. The object perceived is 
not therefore what is concrete or what brings about the abstractions of consciousness. 
Whiteheadian objects are not concrete substances from which abstract properties arise; on 
the contrary, objects are abstractions (Stengers 2014, 90-91). In an events analysis, it is not 
enough to say here is the mouse since it will be perceived in a complex array of abstract 
objects, including how it is sensed through a clicking noise even if it is not seen, as well as the 
haptic physicality and perception of shape or even viewed under a microscope as a mass of 
molecules, and so on. Abstract objects are not experienced merely in the now either. They 
provide a uniqueness and continuity that presents the foothold the mind needs in the events 
that pass it by; there is the mouse and there it is again! It is not, as such, an object in a given 
space. It is a mouse-event or pattern of interaction that produces the subjective reality of the 
mouse. Ontologically, the mouse is not therefore hidden from consciousness, but it is 
declared in the percipient encounter with events (Stengers 2014, 46). To put this another 
way, it is not the abstract properties of the concrete object that declares the mouse, but 
rather the mouse is an abstract object perceived of in the unified concrescence of the events 
that declare it.  The subject who perceives the mouse is not the author of the event, or 
indeed, the author of the many variations in mouse-events. But we must not simply replace 
subject/object with object/event relations. We need to think of interaction as a society or a 
nexus of events in passage that provide ingression to objects so that the object is expressed 
in the event and the event expressed in the object (Whitehead 2004, 144-52). As Stengers 
(2014, 52) puts it, every duration of an event “contains other durations and is contained in 
other durations.” This is the relational temporal thickness of Whitehead’s event that cannot 
be grasped in individual points in time or space. As follows, we need to recall that making the 
subject the author of this kind of mouse-event reintroduces bifurcation. The human mind 
(however exceptional its plasticity in nature) cannot experience the whole event. The subject 
does not decide on events (whether the mouse is here or not here), as such. The events 
decide the subject. The subject’s point of view (this percipient window on experience) 
belongs to an “impersonal web” of events (Stengers 2014, 65). To put it another way, events 
are not a privileged conscious point of view the user adopts. Users may well occupy the here, 
but it is their relation to the now that sweeps them up in a complex flow of events in which 
they might confuse the observational present for something that exceeds the mere foothold 
the mind has in all of this complexity.  
To counter the phenomenal mind, which finds meaning in the symmetry of the here and now 
Whitehead introduces us to the asymmetry of the here and now. Yes, the percipient event 
locates us in the here but this here does not move in tandem with the now. The durational 
now scoops up the here producing infinite variation. It is indeed, as Stengers (2014, 67) 
points out, the and in the here and now that really matters in terms of meaning making. This 
is what relates the asymmetrical sense of an observational present (the here) to the now in 
durational passage. This is Whitehead’s cogredience (Whitehead 2004, 108-09), which would 
later be developed more fully in process philosophy as the vector-like concept of prehension. 
Prehending HCI  
The need for prehension begins with a problem regarding how humans confusingly perceive 
what’s here with real things that are supposed to exist at a distance; as there. Prehension, 
according to Lowe (1951, 97), therefore provides the “thread” of process and reality. It is the 
vector that makes events into concrescent unities, and analyzable, as such. The prehension 
take us beyond the here and now of phenomenality by otherwise looking to how the there 
becomes the here. Unlike the idealist’s answer to this problem wherein the abstraction of 
space by the mind results in a solipsistic subjective perception we find a production of reality 
in what is felt is always becoming (Whitehead 1985, 236-43): the past (objective datum – 
what is prehended) is alive and well in the present derivation (subjective form – how it is 
prehended). Prehensions thus provide a way of grasping how what is there becomes 
something here. In other words, a prehension is the relation established between events in 
which the past has a stake in the composition of what is new.  Again, it is not simply the here 
and now (immediate present) that matters to Whitehead, but how prehension sweeps past 
events up into a unity (or nexus) in which something there becomes something here (causal 
efficacy). Following Whitehead’s nonbifurcated event analysis then, the mouse cannot be 
said to be in or out of mind because the past (what is prehended as the mouse) is always in 
the now (this is how the mouse becomes a subjective form). In short, the mouse is 
experienced as a flow of events (a process) whereby the past event flows into the present 
event.  
The use of prehension in critical HCI might also help researchers to go beyond Dourish’s 
criticism of the second cognitive paradigm by not only radically inverting the notion that 
action in the world necessarily comes after concrete experiences of objects (the mouse) 
followed by an abstraction (the mouse in hand or mind), but also questioning the very 
concept of social context. Indeed, as Blackwell (2015) argues, much of the study of situated 
and embodied interaction misses the new technical landscape in which social context is 
engendered by machine learning systems. Machine learning operates on “‘grounded’ data, 
and their ‘cognition’ is based wholly on information collected from the real world” (Blackwell, 
2015). These systems directly interact with social context insofar as they collect data from 
social media, cookies and relational databases making the user experience increasingly 
inferred and akin to Toffler’s forecast of a pre-programmed experience industry.  For 
Blackwell, the critical issue at stake now is that by making humans into “data sources” in the 
service of machine learning systems, it is no longer simply a problem of grasping human 
cognition as situated in the machine, but instead we need to recognize the inhumane 
character of a ‘cognition’ emerging from a new technological context. Prehension can, as 
such, help us to reconceive of a user experience beyond the subjective relations of an 
Euclidean objective world of the here and now, by looking to a spatiotemporal concept of 
interaction defined by what is experienced over there (by a machine) becoming experienced 
here (by the human). These are concerns in critical HCI that considerably overlap with similar 
concerns in media theory. 
Return to Experience Capitalism 
[There has been] a shift in the economy of experience itself, a shift from a media 
system that addresses humans first and foremost to a system that registers the 
environmentality of the world itself, prior to, and without any necessary relation 
with, human affairs (Hansen 2015, 8). 
Marc Hansen’s use of Whitehead helps us to conclude this discussion with a seemingly 
different orientation of the problem concerning human experience in digital culture to that 
forwarded by phenomenological HCI. It is, ultimately, a post-phenomenological media theory 
which unashamedly backslides into the phenomenological human-centred territory it tries to 
escape, but, nonetheless, Hansen draws attention to the difficulties of developing a robust 
nonbifurcated analysis of experience capitalism. His argument is a complex one, the detail 
and fault lines of which cannot be fully unpacked here, but I want to focus for a moment on 
one conclusion Hansen makes concerning the human experience of twenty-first-century 
media; that is to say, that the current wave of digital media technology refuses human minds 
access to the kind of worldly experience the phenomenological matrix introduces. This is 
because, what Hansen (2015, 81) calls ‘higher-order perceptual experiences’ are no longer 
implicated, he claims, in the making of the operational levels of digital culture, including data 
gathering and mining.  
At first look, this may seem like a plausible explanation for what happens when capitalism, 
weaponized by the latest operations of digital technology, captures and commodifies 
experience. Nonetheless, what I argue here is that the notion of the loss of human 
experience in digital culture, suggested by Hansen, glosses over Whitehead’s more profound 
and constraining concept of nonbifurcated actual experience - something Hansen (2015) 
reduces to this “worldly production of experience” in which the ontology of duration appears 
to be full of gaps and ruptures between human consciousness and technologically produced 
experience. As Greg Seigworth (2015) similarly argues in a recent talk: 
Hansen opens an experiential gap or an interval between the body’s perceptual 
apparatuses and the making of worldly sensibility (the latter can be done and done 
more comprehensively in Hansen’s view by, say, technical machines of various 
sorts). But such a conception creates a rather troubling kind of ahistorical 
suspension or hiatus in any sense of what might be longer stretches of temporal 
continuity – durations persisting alongside any array of ruptures / gaps / delays – 
within the ontological itself.  
To be sure, the experiential gap that Hansen offers up seems to break all the rules of 
Whiteheadian nonbifurcation. The point is that human experience is not increased or 
lessened; it is not a case of less or more consciousness in twenty-first-century media, or for 
that matter is experience something that can simply fall through an experiential gap. On the 
contrary, experience is generative in the circuitries of the capitalist economy, which records 
and patterns interactions as they occur in spatiotemporal occasions. Indeed, the experience 
of the there, and there it is again, mouse-event is transformed in pervasive digital media, but 
only in respect to the novel digital objects that now ingress with the thickness of durational 
passage.  
Significantly, ubiquitous, always-on, big-time data gathering operations do capture more 
experience than a mere mouse click, but we have our media history confused if we think that 
there was ever a time when the human mind had a privileged status in media space. 
Hansan’s account, like the phenomenological matrix, is reminiscent of the alien in Nicolas 
Roeg’s 1976 film The Man Who Fell to Earth, Thomas Newton, who can experience all of the 
events of the analogue media world into which he fell. Sitting in front of multiple TV screens 
Newton seems to inhabit the symmetry of the here and how. “Get out of my mind, all of 
you… Leave my mind alone, all of you. Stay where you belong!” he shouts at the screens. But 
humans are not aliens of this kind. We cannot detach our experiences of media objects 
(sensed or otherwise) from the entangled thickness of duration. We do not operate from 
such a command post! In other words, while it does seem to be the case that capitalism is, 
via large scale data gathering and machine learning, implicated in the processing of 
experience, it is important to stress that, so-called higher order human experiences are not 
bifurcated from Whitehead’s actual experience, and therefore, rather than being cut out of 
the loop of actual experience, human experiences are instead captured in a complex 
maelstrom of eventful entanglements that confound notions of predicated subjective 
conscious experience and objective reality.  
To conclude, a critical-HCI theory of experience capitalism should not be concerned with 
trying to wrestle back human consciousness from operational media; that is to say, putting 
the command post mind back into the loop between conscious interaction and the 
technological unconscious operations of data gathering. On the contrary, following a 
nonbifurcated line, we might need to admit to the impossibility of such a task and focus 
instead on the far more dystopic grip of experience capitalism in which the mere foothold of 
the mind in the durational thickness of events is captured in a twenty-first-century media 
circuitry. We may choose to ponder our asymmetrical experiences in this circuitry, but the  
most pressing critical issue, it would seem, is the extent to which capitalism experiences us! 
Although seemingly overlapping critical concerns from some quarters of HCI and media 
theory, this circuitry presents a very different politics of experience to those that are founded 
on a perceived loss of human judgement in the face of a new dehumanizing technological 
context. The power of experience capitalism, weaponized by data gathering and machine 
learning, is not to be found in the human’s experiential exclusion from an inhumane world of 
inferred interaction. On the contrary, although there is more work to be carried out to fully 
grasp the folded nature of human computer interaction and its relation to experience 
capitalism, this is a power that seems to tap directly into the often improvised experiences 
and events in which subjectivity is produced. The power of experience capitalism is therefore 
found in a capacity to prehend past events so that they become part of the composition of 




Expand on experience capitalism - Something here on the convergence of current trends in 
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